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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS, 
BIG DATA, AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: 
THE DUTY OF MAJOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL TEAMS TO DISCLOSE 
HEALTH MODELING ANALYSIS TO 
THEIR PLAYERS 
MICHAEL HATTERY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The big data frontier has brought with it nearly innumerable legal  
concerns, ranging from traditional privacy rights to messy and flawed data  
collection, as well as differing interests between those engaging in predictive 
modeling and those who are being used as data points.1  Major League  
Baseball teams are pioneers in the usage of big data, measuring players at a 
scale unseen in most other sectors of business.2  For Major League Baseball 
teams, players, and especially pitchers, are huge financial assets that come 
with significant risk of injury and depreciation.  Free agent deals and contract 
extensions for pitchers who are eligible for free agency can range from  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Michael Hattery was selected as the winner of the 2017 National Sports Law Student Writing 
Competition.  Mike is currently enrolled in his third year of law school at Case Western Reserve  
University School of Law.   
1. Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics in Health Care, 53 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 251 (2016) (noting the split incentive issues which arise from the health modeling using big 
data); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Big Bad Data: Law, Public Health, and Biomedical  
Databases, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (2013) (illuminating the potential risk of flawed or messy  
data); Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in 
Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85 (2012) (arguing for a shift in the privacy 
rights of patients when the information exchanged serves in boosting the efficiency of big data). 
2. TRAVIS SAWCHIK, BIG DATA BASEBALL: MATH, MIRACLES, AND THE END OF A 20-YEAR 
LOSING STREAK (2016) (Articulates the radical expansion of big data usage by Major League  
Baseball teams throughout the past decade). 
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$50–$250 million.3  With this in mind, Major League Baseball teams are  
pushing the envelope in terms of health modeling, relying on numerous types 
of big data inputs for guidance.4  
This note proposes a precisely defined “Right to Know,” providing the  
basis and scope of rights in the burgeoning big data world.  Beginning with the 
history of data collection and analysis in Major League Baseball, this paper 
will demonstrate the need for the Right to Know in the world of emerging  
data.  The argument moves to the legal analysis of the tort law duties of  
employers to disclose health risks to employees and potential employees.  
Next, this note will analyze whether Major League Baseball players should be 
considered “employees” in regard to tort law duties.  While this Right to 
Know is anchored in tort law, its underlying principles align with those of  
informed consent.  The establishment of the Right to Know through legal  
principle and precedent provides protection for athletes in the age of big data 
and predictive health modeling. 
The level of data collection and modeling, in which Major League  
Baseball teams are engaging, raises the issue of players’ rights.  Specifically, 
the issue is a player’s Right to Know what inferences about him can be drawn 
from the expansive data collected.5  Employee disclosure of health risk is not a 
new concept.  Indeed, it is an accepted principle that employees have a Right 
to Know if any significant risk is uncovered by the employer in a  
pre-employment exam.6  This places a duty to disclose on the shoulders of 
employers who collect extensive data on the physical health of employees.  
This Right to Know must be extended to baseball players whose livelihood is 
dependent on physical health and to data collection outside the traditional 
framework of medical exams.  Major League Baseball players are the first to 
encounter a problem that will have far-reaching consequences.  The Right to 
Know established in the context of Major League Baseball has the potential to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. Steve Gilbert, Zack Greinke Signs With D-backs, MLB (Dec. 8, 2015) 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/158861948/zack-greinke-signs-with-d-backs/ (Zack Greinke signs  
contracts with the Arizona Diamondbacks worth 206 million dollars over six years); Quinn Roberts, 
Red Sox Sign David Price to Seven Year Deal, MLB (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/158847426/red-sox-sign-david-price-to-seven-year-deal/ (David Price 
a left handed pitcher signs a seven year deal with the Boston Red Sox for 217 million dollars). 
4. JEFF PASSAN, THE ARM: INSIDE THE BILLION-DOLLAR MYSTERY OF THE MOST VALUABLE 
COMMODITY IN SPORTS (2016) (establishing the monetary value of the individual’s body, and then 
the importance of knowledge in order to make long term decisions). 
5. Major League Baseball’s most recent collective bargaining agreement does not establish a  
player’s Right to Know regarding team data modeling but merely requires the dissemination of  
traditional medical information when the player reaches free agency. 
6. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 420 (2d ed. 2017), Westlaw.  
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alter the right of those who are employed by corporations who wish to track 
and monitor employees in detail.  It is easy to envision data collection on risk 
factors in high stress jobs like long haul truck drivers, pilots, or market traders. 
Major League Baseball is merely the tip of the iceberg in the big data  
evolution and the employees’ rights must be protected. 
The Right to Know will come at a cost for organizations because it will  
allow their employees to make more rational decisions about treatment and 
healthcare strategies.  Sports teams, like other businesses, often have different 
short-term and long-term goals from their employees, which means that when 
an employee makes rational decisions in light of disclosed information the 
employer’s ability to achieve goals may be adversely impacted.  The player’s 
Right to Know may conflict with an organization’s interest in maintaining  
information asymmetry as it relates to player negotiations or the trading of 
these player assets.7  The Right to Know must trump these concerns because 
an individual’s right to make informed decisions regarding his healthcare is an 
essential right.  The era of big data makes it crucial that the Right to Know be 
added to the bundle of rights afforded to employees and healthcare consumers, 
alongside the right to privacy and the duty to provide informed consent.  
Therefore, Major League Baseball teams must provide their players with any 
predictive modeling information that may have an impact on the players’ 
healthcare decisions. 
Part II of this note introduces the proposed Right to Know as well as  
presenting the scope and basis of the right. Specifically, that the Right to 
Know places a burden on employers who collect extensive information on 
their employees to provide information on an employee’s health risks.  Part III 
of this note discusses the evolution of big data baseball and demonstrates the 
extensive amount of data that Major League Baseball teams are collecting. 
Section IV discusses the difficult position in which physicians and team  
medical staff are placed in professional sports.  Most importantly, the  
challenges of balancing what is best for the player versus what is best for the 
team.  Section V introduces the Colin Rea hypothetical that is used to  
illuminate the issues created when an organization has significantly more 
knowledge of an employee’s health risk than the employee himself.  Section 
VI argues that there is a legal basis for the Right to Know.  The legal basis 
analysis is separated into two distinct parts which are the principles and  
practice of informed consent followed by the tort law duty of disclosure as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7. This comment often refers to the notion of the player as an asset to the organization he plays 
for.  This is because in many ways teams must operate based on the notion that these are assets they 
must value properly in order to make optimal baseball decisions.  The significant financial costs of 
each player and long-term projections shape how the team will use the asset, keep, trade, or cut. 
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seen in pre-employment and employment physicals.  The construction of the 
Right to Know is done in conjunction with its application to Major League 
Baseball.  Section VII considers the evolving rights of individuals in a  
similarly evolving context to big data, genomic testing; importantly, whether 
these fields will force an evolving definition of researcher and researcher duty.  
The final section summarizes the central arguments of the note. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
The Right to Know is a term coined and defined in this paper to provide 
specific healthcare access rights in the age of big data.  The Right to Know is 
inferred from tort law doctrine and the basic principles upon which informed 
consent is founded.  This “Right to Know” should provide individuals,  
specifically Major League Baseball players, with access to information that 
indicates significant health risks threatening the quality of life or livelihood of 
the player.  By this inference, the Right to Know requires the possessors of the 
information to affirmatively give this information to the subjects of data  
collection and analysis.  
 
Figure One: 
 
 
This requirement would create a tort law duty of disclosure for the employer 
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or data collector who discovers a health risk through predictive health data 
modeling. 
The context of this comment is about Major League Baseball because of 
the variety and scale of data collection in which its organizations are invested.  
The ability to make fundamental health decisions based on the best available 
information is an essential right of the healthcare consumer and requires the 
creation and extension of a Right to Know for Major League Baseball players. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF BIG DATA IN BASEBALL 
Baseball is a game defined by numbers, be it 3,000 hits, 755 home runs, or 
DiMaggio’s 56 game hit streak.  In this way, it was riper than any other sport 
for big data growth.  This data surge, led by writers like Bill James,8  
manifested in Major League Baseball organizations in the 1990s.  In the late 
‘90s, the Cleveland Indians constructed the first comprehensive player data 
collection system called DiamondView.9  The Oakland Athletics would soon 
become famous for installing a leadership structure based on the principle that 
data could drive a team’s success, popularized by the book Moneyball.10  Soon 
baseball teams were hiring the best and brightest data analysts from America’s 
elite universities to synthesize the pools of information being collected.11 
At the outset of big data usage in baseball, the priority was finding  
inefficiencies in the marketplace, that is, skills that were undervalued in trades 
or in free agent contracts.12  Teams in smaller economic markets needed to 
find holes in the marketplace where skills were undervalued, and they  
discovered the relevance of data points including on-base percentage, up the 
middle defense, and optimal reliever leverage usage.13  As the data grew richer 
and richer, and the incremental gains from player performance research  
continually decreased, baseball once again looked for new frontiers in its use 
of big data. Researchers looked to microscopic differences for advantages,  
implementing data analysis to measure a catcher’s ability to frame the  
baseball.  One big frontier remained: injury risk analysis.  If any organization 
could predict and avoid serious injuries or even estimate risk with minimal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. Bill James is in many ways the father of analytics in sports, which he began by publishing a  
periodical titled Baseball Abstract. 
9. Alex Kaufman, Moneyball, Before Moneyball Was Cool, ESPN (June 7, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/blog/sweetspot/post/_/id/48166/moneyball-before-moneyball-was-cool. 
10. MICHAEL L. LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004). 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.; JONAH KERI, THE EXTRA 2%: HOW WALL STREET STRATEGIES TOOK A MAJOR LEAGUE 
BASEBALL TEAM FROM WORST TO FIRST (2011). 
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error, it would have a huge informational advantage. 
A. Pursuit of Big Data’s Injury Risk Modeling Advantage 
The race to informational advantage was led by the small market Tampa 
Bay Rays.14  The pursuit of this advantage was both competitive and secretive.  
The Rays hired a physicist and math professor named Josh Kalk, a writer on 
the cutting edge of analyzing PITCHf/x data, which captures significant data 
about a pitcher’s movements.15  For Kalk this was the opportunity of a  
lifetime.  The Rays immediately emphasized the need for Kalk’s transition to 
their organization to remain a secret: “Tell no one, they told the new guy.  
Send a cryptic good-bye to the blogosphere if you want.  That’s it.  Not only 
was Kalk barred from revealing the identity of his new employer, but the Rays 
took the added step of leaving his name off their front office directory.”16 
This is but one example of initiatives to create and hide proprietary risk 
analysis that numerous Major League Baseball organizations undertook.  The 
issue, however, is striking.  The Rays were hiring a researcher to potentially 
solve pitcher health risk questions, but only for their own proprietary success, 
not for the benefit of the individual pitcher or their league-wide counterparts.17 
B. The Analytical Value of PITCHf/x Data 
PITCHf/x is a useful example of the types of big data sources Major League 
Baseball teams collect and curate because pieces of PITCHf/x data are public-
ly available.18  PITCHf/x is a data collection system developed by Sportvision 
in 2006.19  The system collects data points as simple as velocity, but more im-
portantly for injury modeling; PITCHf/x collects the arm angle and release 
point of the baseball.20  Below, Figure Two displays velocity as collected by 
PITCHf/x and Figure Two displays release point data.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14. KERI, supra note 13, at 189. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Risk factors indicative of likelihood of injury discovered by quantitative analysis should not be 
kept for proprietary use if they could protect an individual from injury in another organization.  
18. PITCHf/x is the portion of the iceberg above water with vast information being below the  
surface in the hands of proprietary analysts. 
19. KERI, supra note 13. 
20. Id. 
21. Player Card: Josh Tomlin, BROOKSBASEBALL, 
http://www.brooksbaseball.net/scatter.php?player=458708&b_hand=-
1&x_axis=pfx_x&gFilt=&pFilt=FA|SI|FC|CU|SL|CS|KN|CH|FS|SB&time=month&minmax=&y_axi
s=x0&s_type=2&startDate=03/30/2007&endDate=01/22/2017 (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
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Figure Two:22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. Id. 
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Figure Three:23 
 
Kalk used a combination of this data and other data points to monitor in-game 
and long-term injury risk “by combining PITCHf/x input with an artificial 
neural network algorithm (a system that looks at everything from a lower arm 
slot to velocity changes and movement on a pitch).”24  In this way, “Kalk 
could spot early warning signs . . . and warn of potential injury risk.”25  The 
neural network algorithm is just one approach, and organizations can include 
other inputs to measure other short-term and long-term risks.  These potential 
inputs can include full body sensors, body health monitors, and other  
biometric data.26 
PITCHf/x, while expansive in its data and inquiries, is but one data  
collection system used by teams.  Major League Baseball’s media group, also 
known as BAM, has created a data collection system with seemingly infinite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23. Id. 
24. KERI, supra note 13, at 189. 
25. Id. 
26. To the common person biometric data generally means not wanting to know what one’s BMI 
is, not anything particularly complex. 
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measurements.27  The most recent collection breakthrough publicized in 2015 
incorporates radar technology with three high-definition cameras known  
publicly as Statcast.28  Their purpose is to collect three dimensional snapshots 
of every single movement that occurs on a baseball field in great detail, using 
roughly “40,000 frames per second converted to digital data.”29  With data  
collection of this size, diving into the data and sorting out the noise is a  
time-consuming task.  For instance, a routine ground out can fill the equivalent 
of 21,000 rows of data on a spreadsheet.30  
Major League Baseball’s Statcast creation is an important addition to the 
conversation because it tracks physical movements of pitchers and position 
players with a level of precision unseen in even PITCHf/x data.  However, the 
vast nature of the data collection means that the health modeling gains will 
likely be incremental as organizations attempt to incorporate the sea of  
information into existing models.  The precision of predictive health modeling 
is expected to improve over the course of the next decade as teams become 
better at parsing useful data from noisy data.31 
IV. SPLIT INCENTIVES IN SPORTS MEDICINE 
Professional athletes and professional sports teams exist in a gray and 
complex paradigm with regard to medical treatment.  This begins with the 
physician-client relationship.  When the physician is hired by an organization 
for non-therapeutic examinations his duty to the patient is unclear with  
professional sports teams.32  This is because the organization, the doctor’s  
employer, often has specific revenue interests: 
 
Team physicians, often considered part of the team, can  
indirectly cause a team to lose by properly asserting that a star 
player is physically unable to perform.  Management may work 
years if not decades for a chance to go to the playoffs or win a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27. Bruce Schoenfeld, Can New Technology Bring Baseball’s Data Revolution to Fielding?, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 30, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/can-new-technology-
bring-baseballs-data-revolution-to-fielding.html?_r=0. 
28. The NBA has incorporated a similar system for capturing photographs and collecting digital 
data called Sportvu.  
29. Schoenfeld, supra note 27. 
30. Id. 
31. Precision is important to this conversation as the error bars on predictive health modeling  
remain significant. 
32. Charles V. Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising from the Team Physician's Dual  
Obligations to the Athlete and Management, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 299, 326 (1987). 
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title, consequently, owners will not tolerate a team doctor who is 
so cautious that it causes the team to lose.33  
 
The conflicting pressures of short-term team gain and long-term player costs 
create a constant struggle.34  
One issue of conflicting interests in the team-doctor-player relationship is 
the manner in which the doctor is employed by the team.35  Contract law has 
been used to alter the relationship between the team and players in terms of 
treatment.36  However it is defined contractually, the relationship between 
physician and team is one involving enormous financial interests.  Indeed, 
teams have even employed physicians who have a financial stake in the  
organization itself.37  In fact, it has become increasingly common in  
professional sports for teams to have physicians as sponsors or partners of the 
teams.38  This conflict-laden relationship between team physician and player is 
so complex and risk-heavy that scholars have suggested that physicians should 
be employed by labor unions rather than the teams themselves to avoid  
physicians being faced with split incentive problems when balancing the needs 
of the organization and the individual.39  This approach would transition  
physicians from team employees to third parties whose primary duty is to the 
patient without the distracting concern of the impact a physician’s decision 
may have on a physician’s team-employer.40 
This complex relationship harms the player in certain circumstances, and 
this Comment presents two clear examples of potential conflicts.  First,  
consider a star football player with an injured shoulder pulled from a playoff 
game and evaluated by the onsite physicians.  The physician has a duty to the 
player41 but is paid by the team.  There are clear risks for the player but a clear 
upside for the team if the player is cleared and returned to the game.  Charles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33. Scott Polsky, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doctors' Conflicts of Interest, 14 
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 503, 504 (1998). 
34. Id.; James H. Davis, "Fixing" the Standard of Care: Motivated Athletes and Medical Malprac-
tice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215 (1988). 
35. Russell, supra note 32, at 307. 
36. Id. 
37. Polsky supra note 33, at 503.  
38. Id. at 523. 
39. Sigmund J. Solares, Preventing Medical Malpractice of Team Physicians in Professional 
Sports: A Call for the Players Unions to Hire the Team Physicians in Professional Sports, 4 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 235, 237 (1997). 
40. Id. at 239.  
41. Id. at 249. 
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Russell looked at sixty-seven cases in which NFL players sued their teams for 
being cleared to return to a game, and in every case the team physician  
testified on behalf of the team.42  To argue that the player and team have 
aligned medical interests would be absurd.  Now consider a Major League 
pitcher on the mound in game four of the World Series.  The team is  
monitoring the pitcher’s PITCHf/x data and notes that his arm slot has 
changed significantly in the past inning and his velocity decreased.43  The 
team can remove the pitcher to avoid further potential injury risk or continue 
using the pitcher in pursuit of playoff success.  These situations are in many 
ways analogous as the team controls the player whose livelihood and  
happiness depend upon physical health.  In this way, the data health modeling 
problem mirrors the dilemmas of onsite physicians. 
Because of these split incentive problems, the duty to the athlete versus 
the interests of the employer, the Right to Know, must be extended to Major 
League Baseball players.  When a significant portion of a player’s medical  
advice comes from doctors and employees of a team with economic  
incentives, the player must be provided protections.  The Right to Know is 
central to remedying this problem because it allows the player to move health 
modeling data between analysts, doctors, and organizations in order to ensure 
that the player is making informed medical decisions.  Allowing a player  
access to the data and modeling collected provides him with the opportunity to 
evaluate the risk and avoid being manipulated by an organization whose  
long-term interests may be different from his.  The right to informed consent 
and informed decision making is central to a patients’ rights.  Essential to  
informed decision making is a Right to Know the information gathered about 
the patient.  
The Right to Know transcends medicine and has grown in other arenas as 
data itself has changed and evolved.  The United States’ legal system values 
the individual’s right to informed decision making.  One would not need to 
look beyond credit score access legislation to realize the importance of an  
individual’s right to access information constructed by a data collector and  
potentially informing the individual’s health care decision making process.44  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42. Russell, supra note 32, at 322. 
43. Shifts in arm slot and velocity do not always belie decreased effectiveness, at least not to the 
point of requiring a substitution.  A 2–3 MPH decrease is significant in terms of indicating a growing 
risk of injury but a fastball velocity decrease from 96 MPH to 94 MPH may not substantively impact 
expected performance.  This is especially true if it widens the delta in velocity difference between a 
pitcher’s fastball and secondary offerings.  Further, a few pitchers will modulate their arm slot in  
order to increase the deceptiveness of pitch, therefore, arm slot changes do not inherently signal  
decreased effectiveness. 
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2017). 
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This Right to Know will be essential to the health care consumer as doctors 
and insurance agencies wield modern data collecting devices like Apple 
Watches and FitBits and further integrate them into team’s data collection tool 
kits.45 
V. THE COLIN REA HYPOTHETICAL 
As the precision of predictive health modeling improves, the likelihood 
that teams will be able to identify “ticking time bomb” injuries increases.  This 
raises the possibility of a team flipping the asset before it explodes and  
ultimately craters in value.46  The notion of flipping the asset before it  
depreciates is born out in the Colin Rea Hypothetical.  Nearing the August 1, 
2016 Major League Baseball trade deadline, the San Diego Padres traded  
Andrew Cashner and Colin Rea to the Miami Marlins for multiple prospects.47  
Rea left the game injured in his first appearance with the Marlins, and soon  
after the Marlins traded him back to the Padres for one of the minor league 
prospects involved in the original deal.48  Upon being returned to the Padres, 
Rea was immediately placed on the disabled list.49  The Padres were quickly 
criticized for dealing potentially damaged goods before they depreciated in 
value, and similar accusations were made regarding their trade of Drew  
Pomeranz to the Boston Red Sox.50  In both of these cases the Padres had 
compiled two sets of health records, one set to be disclosed in trade  
negotiations and one set to remain under confidential control of the team.51 
In both of these situations, the Padres understood that two of their players 
had significant injury risks and would depreciate in value between August 1st 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45. Porter Wright Morris, Arthur LLP, Privacy Risks of Google Glass and Similar Devices, 24 No. 
7 Ohio Emp. L. Letter 7 (2013) (discussing the privacy right concerns and legal impacts of devices 
like Google Glasses and FitBits). 
46. While the use of the term asset may seem inhumane and utilitarian, from the team’s  
perspective they are best viewed as assets with either net surplus value or net loss. 
47. Major League Baseball Transactions, MLB, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/transactions/?tcid=mm_mlb_players#month=7&year=2016&team_id=135 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2017) (prospects are players who have yet to reach the Major Leagues and are 
considered long-term developmental players rather than big league ready). 
48. Matt Snyder, In Strangest MLB Trade Deadline Twist, Marlins Send Colin Rea Back to Pa-
dres, CBSSPORTS (Aug 1, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/in-strangest-mlb-trade-
deadline-twist-marlins-send-colin-rea-back-to-padres/. 
49. Id. 
50. Michael McCann, Padres GM AJ Preller Suspended: Can Red Sox Sue?, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 16, 2016, http://www.si.com/mlb/2016/09/16/padres-gm-aj-preller-suspended-
trade-red-sox-pomeranz. 
51. Id. 
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and the offseason.52  The team inferred this risk by merging traditional medical 
evaluations with modern predictive health modeling using data collection 
tools.  This type of practice places a player at a significant risk of being  
mishandled because the team in possession of his health risk data has an  
incentive to hide it until that player is unloaded.  Therefore, the player is not 
being allowed to make optimal health decisions because he does not have  
access to information that may alter his trade value.  If Rea had foreseen the 
risk and gone on the Disabled List for preventive treatment, he would have 
benefitted greatly, but the Padres would then have an essentially useless asset.  
The Rea Hypothetical is the reason why players must have a Right to Know 
what risk factors are indicated in big data and predictive health modeling.53  
This hypothetical is essential in framing the duties discussed in the remainder 
of this note. 
VI. LEGAL BASIS FOR RIGHT TO KNOW 
The proposed Right to Know is rooted in two major legal doctrines.  The 
theoretical principles are those founded in informed consent, the human  
being’s essential right to make informed decisions about medical procedures, 
and health treatment. Demonstrated by the following analysis, informed  
consent and tort law’s duty of disclosure establish reciprocal rights54 that  
together are the basis of the Right to Know.  The legal precedent and approach 
is derived from the tort law duty to disclose, which applies to employers.55  In 
order to trigger this legal duty, Major League Baseball players must qualify as 
employees under tort law. 
A. The Essential Right of Informed Consent 
Informed consent has become a focal point of medical practice and the law 
of medicine.  The history of informed consent is traced to the Nuremberg  
Trials following World War II.56  The Nuremberg Trials included Nazi doctors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52. Id.; Snyder supra note 48. 
53. This is titled a hypothetical in this comment because of one specific modification I made.  
While it appears likely that big data and predictive health modeling played a role in the Padres  
decision it is not a certainty.  Therefore, I mirrored the facts from the situation referenced with one 
alteration to illuminate what a data driven health decision could look like. 
54. The United States Supreme Court in a First Amendment case held that where there are rights 
or duties there are reciprocal rights.  The court held specifically “[i]f there is a right to advertise, there 
is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be asserted.”  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976). 
55. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232 (6th Cir. 1956). 
56. David A. Lenrow, The Treating Physician as Researcher: Is Assuming This Dual Role a  
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who had conducted cruel medical experiments on concentration camp inmates 
that often disfigured or killed the subject.57  The tribunal instituted a set of 
principles now known as the Nuremberg Code that provided rules for research 
on human subjects.58  The first principle, and for analytical purposes the most 
important, was the language instituting informed consent:  
 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely  
essential.  This means that the person involved should have 
legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be 
able to exercise free power of choice . . . and should have  
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an  
understanding and enlightened decision.59 
 
Thus, research subjects have a right to “sufficient knowledge.”60   
Sufficient knowledge requires the doctor or researcher to provide information 
in order that an individual makes an informed decision.61  This duty to provide 
information, such that an individual have sufficient knowledge, has a  
reciprocal right. The reciprocal right is an individual’s Right to Know the  
nature and risks of a procedure. 
Sufficient knowledge was further defined by the tribunal when it listed the 
following as information that must be disclosed to the subject: 
 
(1) the “nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;” (2) 
the “method and means by which it is to be conducted;” (3) 
“all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected;” 
and (4) the “effects upon his health or person which may  
possibly come from his participation in the experiment.” 
Thus, under Nuremberg, the disclosure of this information is 
necessary to ensure the subject's self-determination.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Violation of the Nuremberg Code?, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 15 (2006).  
57. Id. 
58. Jacob Schuman, Beyond Nuremberg: A Critique of "Informed Consent" in Third World  
Human Subject Research, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 125 (2012). 
59. GEORGE J. ANNAS & MICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG 
CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (1992). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Jennifer Y. Seo, Raising the Standard of Abortion Informed Consent: Lessons to Be Learned 
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This further definition includes broad phrases like “effects upon his health or 
person” and “inconveniences . . . to be reasonably expected.”63  This broad 
language provides a philosophical anchor for a Right to Know when data  
collected about an individual affects his or her person and may result in a  
“reasonably expected inconvenience” when the data is interpreted.  
As biomedical research continues to expand, the importance of informed 
consent as a bedrock right is growing; informed consent is a “basic ethical  
protection for research involving human participants.”64  Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo opined, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”65  Since the 1970s 
there has been an added emphasis on “patient-centered practice” which is 
based on the idea that patient autonomy in medical decision-making is a  
priority.66  The provision of information is essential to the achievement of this 
priority: “Respecting a patient’s autonomy means respecting their wishes  
regarding what information is relevant to their decision.”67  The issue exists in 
establishing the type of information that may be considered necessary to make 
an informed decision. 
The growth of medical data and information must evolve at a similar rate 
to that of the application of informed consent in order to protect the very  
purpose of the doctrine.  As precision improves regarding morbidity and  
mortality rates, courts have held that a doctor must disclose statistics where 
there is a significant difference between success rates of different procedures 
or doctors.68  Difference in treatment success, not individual doctors’ success 
rates, is where the duty to disclose exists.69  Further, the seminal case Moore v. 
Regents University of California requires that doctors disclose research and 
economic interests that may influence treatment.70   
Informed consent occupies two interrelated spaces, doctors and medical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from the Ethical and Legal Requirements for Consent to Medical Experimentation, 21 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 357, 364 (2011). 
63. Id. 
64. Schuman, supra note 58, at 124. 
65. B. Sonny Bal & Theodore J. Coma, What to Disclose? Revisiting Informed Consent, 470 
CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS AND RELATED RES. 1346 (2012). 
66. Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The 
Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85 (2010). 
67. Id. 
68. Bal & Coma, supra note 65. 
69. Id. 
70. Moore v. Regents Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990). 
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researchers.  This comment focuses on the scope and requirements placed on 
researchers, but the duty placed on doctors is substantive. Informed consent as 
applied to doctors is most easily seen in the context of surgery.  Though tort 
law is a state law issue, there is a national consensus spanning back into the 
early twentieth century that barring exceptional circumstances an operation 
without informed consent constitutes an assault by the doctor.71  However, the 
research liability is most frequently applied to doctors acting in the role of  
researcher.  Doctors as researchers can take on different functions: researching 
targeted DNA structure, testing a new treatment method, or seeking more  
understanding of how a particular disease advances.72 
A team’s treatment of a professional athlete is laden with research and 
economic interests that will impact the type of treatment recommended and 
provided for the player.  In a league where the average team payroll for  
players is just above $100 million, the economic interests of organizations are 
significant.73  Player contracts often shift the priority of treatment for a player.  
A low risk arm problem will be treated differently by the organization in the 
case of a pitcher with four years and $100 million remaining on his contract 
versus a pitcher who is pre-arbitration74 and making the Major League  
minimum. Major League Baseball contracts are often insured,75 a la Alex  
Rodriguez,76 include health-based clauses that impact the earnings of the  
player, or manifest themselves in player-controlled vesting options.77  A  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71. See Inderbitzen v. Lane Hosp., 12 P.2d 744, 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) (woman subjected to  
extensive examinations from multiple doctors without consenting and against her will); McClees v.  
Cohen, 148 A. 124, 125 (Md. 1930) (removal of multiple teeth without the informed consent of the 
plaintiff); Dicenzo v. Berg, 16 A.2d 15, 16 (Pa. 1940) (exceptional circumstances of significant spinal 
injury did not require surgeon to receive consent). 
72. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 480; Lenahan v. Univ. of Chicago, 808 N.E.2d  1078, 1081 (Ill. 2004) 
(doctor performing role of researcher failed to get proper informed consent from patient who partook 
in experimental chemotherapy treatments which involved t-cell removal and infusion). 
73. MLB 2017 Payroll Tracker, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/payroll/ (last visited Dec. 
14, 2017). 
74. In Major League Baseball a team has six years of control over a player it drafts or signs before 
they have reached the big leagues.  The first three years are pre-arbitration where players are paid the 
league minimum just north of $600,000. 
75. When Major League Baseball teams sign high value long-term contracts they often insure 
them against injury.  In this circumstance, if Jason Giambi tears his ACL and the team insures him 
during a contract, then the insurance company would pay out whatever number the team insured him 
at. 
76. Wallace Matthews, Alex Rodriguez’s Contract -- New York Yankees Insured for Most of 
$114M (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.espn.com/new-york/mlb/story/_/id/8708864/alex-rodriguez-
contract-new-york-yankees-insured-most-114m-source-says.  
77. Players with significant injury histories will often sign contracts where health is factored in to 
create a long-term obligation.  For instance, a player can sign a contract creating a vesting option if 
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player’s health is so important to Major League Baseball teams that contracts 
often feature terms that ban certain low risk behavior like bowling, bocce,  
table tennis, billiards, fishing, and croquet.78  Therefore, the economic interests 
teams and the physicians they employ have in players is enormous. 
Research is also important to competitive advantage; tracking the  
performance decline curve of certain injuries could provide long-term value, 
informing future decision-making about players’ health.  Depending on the 
player, organizations can obtain value in trying different treatment methods to 
determine what the optimal future choice is no matter the short-term  
implications.  Indeed, Major League Baseball players can be considered at any 
time organizational assets, research subjects, data points, and far too rarely, 
human beings. 
In Moore v. Regents of University of California, the plaintiff brought a 
cause of action against his physicians for conversion and breach of duty  
because the physicians and researchers used the plaintiff’s cells in research 
which the defendants would soon patent.79  The plaintiff was in the midst of 
being treated for Hairy-Cell Leukemia and asserted that during procedures 
recommended to treat his malady, physicians extracted cells that would be 
used for their own personal research.80  Plaintiff then argued “that his  
physician failed to disclose preexisting research and economic interests in the 
cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which they were 
extracted.”81  The power of this case is that it extends the duty of informed 
consent to physicians who are working as researchers with an economic or 
personal interest in the information.  The court stated: “[a]ccordingly, we hold 
that a physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure 
must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed 
consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether 
research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”82  
The heart of the extension in Moore is that those who act primarily as 
healthcare providers must disclose their interests, research or economic, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the plater reaches five hundred plate appearances or two hundred innings, major health milestones.  
Jeff Todd, Options in MLB Contracts: Primary Option Types, MLB TRADE RUMORS (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2014/01/options-in-mlb-contracts-primary-option-types.html.  
78. Tyler Kepner, BASEBALL; Boone’s Injury Could Cost Him His Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/27/sports/baseball-boone-s-injury-could-cost-him-his-
contract.html?_r=0. 
79. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 485. 
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would impact their treatment of the players.  Doctors who render patient care 
are generally involved in a team-constructed system where the team itself is 
the primary care provider.83  Major League Baseball team medical staffs are 
large groups, including a medical director, head trainer, other physicians,  
specialists in sports medicine, and now, data analysts.84  Players have the right 
to request a second opinion from physicians and analysts outside the  
organization.85  However, the team health and wellness apparatus is so tightly 
integrated that second opinions are generally only requested when a player is 
facing significant injury prognosis.86  In terms of day-to-day treatment, which 
is significant over the course of a grueling 162-game season, players are  
treated by trainers who are interacting with the rest of the team’s medical 
staff.87  
As Moore notes, informed consent has traditionally been a duty triggered 
through medical research, though this holding regarding research roles creates 
broader implications.88  However, physician-only does not serve as a limit in 
the Major League Baseball context.  To use the small market Cleveland  
Indians as an example, they directly employ a Head Team Physician and five 
other physicians.89  Further, they contract with eleven consulting physicians 
and employ seven in their training department.90  Risk indicators calculated 
using big data in predictive health modeling is a portion of in-house treatment 
which leads to a team having one of its physicians meet with the player.91  For 
the player not to be informed of the results of risk-modeling analysis that 
prompted a meeting with the physician defies principles of informed consent 
established in the Nuremberg Code and Moore. 
Even mid-twentieth century disclosure practices required that the doctor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83. Dr. Struan Coleman, The Role of an MLB Team Physician, HSS BLOG (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.hss.edu/playbook/the-role-of-an-mlb-team-physician/#.WHe2KPkrKM8. 
84. Id. 
85. Paul Hoynes, Second Opinion Reveals Cleveland Indians' Michael Brantley Has Right Biceps 
Tendinitis, CLEVELAND (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.cleveland.com/tribe/index.ssf/2016/06/second_opinion_reveals_clevela.html. 
86. Grant Brisbee, David Price Is Getting a Second Opinion from Dr. James Andrews, Which 
Usually Doesn’t End Well, SB NATION (Mar. 2, 2017), 
http://www.sbnation.com/2017/3/2/14790838/david-price-injury-dr-james-andrews-second-opinion.  
87. Coleman, supra note 83. 
88. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990). 
89. Front Office, CLEVELAND INDIANS, 
http://cleveland.indians.mlb.com/team/front_office.jsp?c_id=cle (last visited Dec. 14, 2017).  
90. Id. 
91. KERI, supra note 13. 
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provide an acknowledgment of the risks of a procedure.92  At first glance, this 
simple requirement seems to be inapplicable to the Major League Baseball 
player who has a significant risk of shoulder destruction.  Informed consent 
includes the need to disclose the risks of a specific course of medical  
treatment.93  Ignoring a risk is a course of treatment.  Choosing to require a 
pitcher to continue pitching despite significant risks of more extensive  
physical damage is a choice of treatment.  Choosing to do the aforementioned 
without information detailing the potential risk of doing so should constitute a 
lack of informed consent because the players reciprocal Right to Know has 
been violated.  Therefore, offering no treatment despite a significant risk of 
injury indicated by predictive health modeling is a breach of informed consent 
because the player has not been provided his Right to Know, implicit in  
informed consent. 
B. Pre-Employment Exams and the Right to Know 
Traditionally, one of the first events that occurs after a hiring in certain 
jobs is a pre-employment physical.  An employer may require an employment 
physical after an offer has been extended, and before the applicant has  
commenced his work, if all entering employees are subjected to the test and 
the information discovered is treated by the employer as confidential medical 
information.94  The purpose of this limitation is to stop employers from using 
pre-employment information to discriminate against potential employees with 
disabilities.95  Pre-employment and continuing physicals are similar to almost 
any other common medical care physical, checking basic indicators or  
markers, although at times including physical exams which are not strictly 
considered medical examinations.96  However, they can, with consent of the 
employee, include advanced biometric data.97   
Pre-employment exams provide significant information to the employer 
regarding the long-term health risks of the employee and can serve as a tool to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92. Bal & Coma, supra note 65. 
93. Id. 
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (2017) (Americans with Disabilities Act limits medical exams in timing 
the in the following way: “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity shall not conduct a 
medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual 
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability”). 
95. Maureen E. Mulvihill, Karraker v. Rent-A-Center: Testing the Limits of the ADA, Personality 
Tests, and Employer Preemployment Screening, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 865, 866 (2006). 
96. ADA Compliance Guide ¶ 231 Defining ‘Medical Examinations,’ Westlaw. 
97. Id. at ¶ 234-4 Wellness Programs. 
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siphon off high-risk employees.98  With this advantage for employers comes a 
duty to disclose significant health risks, demonstrated below in the case law 
review.  With any duty to disclose comes a reciprocal right, in this sphere a 
Right to Know.  A duty for one party to disclose information implies a right to 
the other party that they know the information.  With the scope of information 
discovered, an issue regarding a patient’s Right to Know surfaced: the breadth 
of a doctor’s duty to disclose findings of a physical which denote significant 
health risk to the employee.  
1. Case Law 
The question of the scope of the duty of disclosure and its reciprocal rights 
is in many ways easily resolved, as the potential gain for the employee far 
outweighs the additional duty placed on the doctor.  In balancing the interests 
of the two parties, a physician's burden of informing the examinee of a  
discovered medical condition is significantly less onerous than the examinee's 
interest in maintaining health and life.99  In Stanley v. McCarver, an Arizona 
Supreme Court case, the court holds that once a physician undertakes an  
examination, a physician is obligated to disclose the results to patients: “We 
hold only that a doctor who, for consideration, undertakes to read x-rays, on 
which he observes serious abnormalities, must act reasonably in reading the  
x-rays and reporting the results.”100  Stanley anchors the duty to disclose in the 
heart of tort law: “The duty emanates from the panoply of social concerns that 
generally inform tort law.”101 
The potential value of disclosure is easily seen as many health problems 
disclosed in pre-employment exams are treatable.102  Many diseases that are 
diagnosed through x-rays (a procedure typically administered during pre-
employment examinations) can be treated with a significant probability of 
success if the treatment begins in the early stages of the disease.103  If not, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98. Jan W. Sturner, Preemployment Medical Exams Under the ADA: Conditional Job Offers and 
the Application of the Mixed-Motives Framework, 50 ARK. L. REV. 449, 450 (1997). 
99. Marki Stewart, Great X-pectations: Protecting Examinees' Reliance That No News Is Good 
News, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 229, 242 (2005). 
100. Stanley v. McCarver, 92 P.3d 849, 855 (Ariz. 2004) (patient brought medical malpractice  
action against radiologist arguing that the radiologist failed to inform her of a health risk he had a  
duty to disclose.  Court held that physician-patient relationship is not necessary for a duty to inform to 
exist). 
101. Id. at 856. 
102. Alison Doyle, What Does a Pre-Employment Physical Include?, THE BALANCE (Aug 2, 
2017) https://www.thebalance.com/pre-employment-physicals-2060485 (asthma, high blood pressure, 
heart problems, and other health problems discovered). 
103. Stewart, supra note 99, at 229. 
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potentially treatable condition can spiral into one that is harder to treat or even 
fatal. 
The case law establishing the employer’s duty to disclose harmful condi-
tions discovered in pre-employment exams is expansive.104  An employee may 
reasonably expect that if anything serious is discovered in the pre-employment 
physical, he will be notified, and when the employee does not receive notifica-
tion it is reasonable to believe nothing was uncovered.  For this reason, the 
employer generally owes a duty to disclose serious findings from the pre-
employment exam.105   
In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, an employee, Stapleton, 
was a World War I veteran who had been exposed to mustard gas.106  His em-
ployer took yearly X-rays and discovered that the employee suffered from 
pulmonary tuberculosis.107  The employer failed to notify Stapleton of his 
worsening condition during his employment.108  In an opinion crafted by fu-
ture Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, the court found that the employer 
had a duty to disclose.  
 
Failure of the appellant to disclose to Stapleton what its rec-
ords showed his condition to be was clearly a violation of its 
duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. By remaining  
silent, the appellant permitted Stapleton to rely upon a tacit 
assurance of safety despite its knowledge of the existence of 
danger.109 
 
The duty to disclose extends through the duration of the relationship between 
the employee and the employer.110  Union Carbide establishes that when an 
employer collects medical information about an employee and the information 
indicates a health risk, the employer must disclose this risk to the employee.111  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 234 (6th Cir. 1956); Dornak 
v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 168, 170–71 (La. 1981); McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 183 
A.D.2d 563, 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 441 (N.J. 2001); Stanley, 
92 P.3d at 853. 
105. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 6. 
106. Stapleton, 237 F.2d at 234. 
107. Id. at 231. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 232. 
110. Id. 
111. But see Brittingham v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2011-Ohio-6488; Battistella v. Soc'y of N.Y. 
Hosp., 9 A.D.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959). 
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In essence, when the employee knows information is being collected regarding 
her health, she then has a Right to Know any risks the data uncovers. 
 The Right to Know exists in the relationship between employer and  
employee, or employer and potential employee, but has not yet been extended 
to other types of relationships where the parties use pre-contractual medical 
exams.112  The other instance where pre-contractual medical exams frequently 
occur is health, disability, long-term care and life insurance. However, in these 
contexts, courts have frequently found that an insurer does not have a duty to 
disclose health risks discovered in examinations for the purpose of  
determining insurance coverage.113  In this way, the duty to disclose and by 
extension the Right to Know has been limited to the employer-employee  
relationship.114  The question this raises is whether Major League Baseball 
players should be categorized in the employer-employee bucket or the health 
insurance policy applicant bucket. 
Major League Baseball teams collect health information throughout the 
employment of a player.  Just as the employer in Union Carbide collected  
X-rays, Major League Baseball teams collect troves of information from  
X-rays to PITCHf/x and Statcast data, integrating big data into predictive 
health modeling.  To determine that the risk findings created by big data exist 
outside the duty to disclose would undermine the purpose of the duty.  As tort 
law modulated to include the findings of technological advancements like 
blood testing and X-rays, it must modulate once again to establish a Right to 
Know the implications discovered during big data collection and analysis.  
From pitch velocity to arm slot to front foot landing spot, all of the data these 
teams collect influences the precision of data modeling regarding health risks; 
therefore, it must all be considered medical data. 
2. Major League Baseball Players Qualify as Employees 
Major League Baseball players are retained by Major League Baseball 
teams under contractual agreement for work performance.  Players’ salaries 
are paid by Major League Baseball teams, and they take part in  
pre-employment exams.  When players are drafted from U.S. colleges or high 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112. Deramus v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 1996). 
113. See McLachlan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 05-0052, 2006 WL 6618105, at *8 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 3, 2006), aff'd, 488 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 
488, 497 (S.D. Miss. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Deramus v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
114. This is a strange limitation because a foundational principle for the duty to disclose being 
placed on the employer is that the employee or applicant is under the belief that no news is good 
news. This belief is seemingly unchanged in the life or health insurance context but is not extended. 
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schools, each is given a physical before agreeing to a contract with a Major 
League organization.  These pre-employment exams also occur when signing a 
player from the international talent pool and in post-arbitration free agency.115  
For the sake of labor agreements and collective bargaining, legal analysis 
has qualified players as employees.116  The National Labor Relations Act and 
the National Labor Relations Board qualify Major League Baseball players as 
employees.  The National Labor Relations Board acknowledged that Major 
League Baseball players are employees117 and this position was affirmed in the 
Curt Flood case.118  The employee rights bargained for through the Fair Labor 
Standards Act have made the Major League Baseball Players Association an 
incredibly powerful entity that has nearly leveled the profit shares between 
players and owners.119  For the purposes of this analysis, the Supreme Court’s 
categorization of Major League Baseball as interstate commerce, triggering 
the Fair Labor Standards Act and protecting the players as employees,  
qualifies them as employees when evaluating pre-employment physicals.  
This Right to Know founded in tort law and demonstrated via application 
to Major League Baseball’s data frontier can be extended to individuals who 
work in more common white-collar and blue-collar jobs become more highly 
monitored.  When it comes to individuals in high-stress jobs, monitoring  
underlying health data with devices like a Fitbit, Healthbox from Under  
Armour, MyUVPatch, or Oxxiom, businesses can collect constant heart rate 
data, UV exposure, body fat, workout intensity, and sleep quality.  With all of 
this collected information being electronically transferred to create large  
databases, companies like Major League Baseball teams have many  
opportunities to evaluate employee health risk.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115. See Mike Oz, Astros Fail to Come to Terms with No. 1 Overall Pick Brady Aiken, Two Oth-
ers, YAHOO SPORTS (July 18, 2014), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-league-stew/astros-fail-
to-come-to-terms-with-no--1-overall-pick-brady-aiken--two-others-215717197.html (Astros fail to 
sign draft pick Brady Aiken because of a post draft physical); Mark Polishuk, Possible Snag in Deal 
Between Orioles, Yovani Gallardo, MLB TRADE RUMORS (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2016/02/possible-snag-in-deal-between-orioles-yovani-
gallardo.html (Orioles agreement with free agent Yovani Gallardo breaks down following physical 
examination). 
116. William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on Baseball, Labor, 
and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 61, 76 (2004). 
117. Id. at 66. 
118. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (holding that Major League Baseball was engaged 
in interstate commerce, thus activating the Fair Labor Relations Act). 
119. Ross E. Davies, Along Comes the Players Association: The Roots and Rise of Organized  
Labor in Major League Baseball, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321 (2013). 
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VII. GENOMIC TESTING, RESEARCH SUBJECTS, INCIDENTAL FINDINGS, MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 
Genome testing, like big data, has risen to the forefront of medical  
research with seemingly limitless potential to improve lives as well as create 
ethical dilemmas.  Much like big data in baseball, it sits in the center of the 
Venn diagram incorporated on page 7 with an uncertain legal future. The  
collection and growth of genetic data is developing rapidly, at times outpacing 
our ability to develop legal principles to guide the field.  Genome research has 
been used to evaluate many potential inherited illnesses, from mental illness to 
cancer.120  The breadth of genomic research is staggering, “[W]ith these new 
technologies, researchers are no longer limited to interrogating certain targeted 
portions of the genome; instead they can conduct genome-wide analyses,  
casting a wider net in the hopes of finding answers to their research  
questions.”121  
In the analysis of these large genomic data sets, researchers will at times 
run into incidental findings.122  Incidental finding is best defined in the  
following way: “finding concerning an individual research participant that has 
potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of 
conducting research but is beyond the aims of the study.”123  Incidental  
findings concern a number of discoveries that may affect the life of the  
individual, such as “misattributed paternity,” family disease risk analysis, or 
potentially risky genome sequences which are indicative of long-term health 
concerns.124   
The concept of incidental findings fits the context of Major League  
Baseball.  Those in charge of predictive health monitoring are collecting any 
possible data and spitting out findings without always having a target in mind.  
When parsing through data on a scale not seen before for indicators of health 
injury risk, the likelihood of incidental findings is significant.  The cost of  
genome testing is in nearly constant decline, increasing access and use by the 
general public.125  Not surprisingly, Major League Baseball was an early  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120. Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault? Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental Findings 
in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 797 (2014). 
121. Id. at 800. 
122. Brian Van Ness, Genomic Research and Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 
296 (2008). 
123. Id. at 293. 
124. Id. 
125. Pike et al., supra note 120. 
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mover in genomic testing.  On July 16, 2009, the New York Yankees relied on 
genetic testing to show that a prospect they had signed was actually lying 
about his name and age.126  With genomic testing as yet another data point, 
Major League Baseball teams collect that which can be used in predictive 
health modeling. Like the other types of data discussed above, the results of 
genomic testing continue to blur lines and split incentives for the players,  
physicians, and researchers employed by teams.  
Genomic testing raised questions for the legal community that were eerily 
similar to those of the growth of big data: determining what information  
individuals in a research study had a Right to Know.  While there was a  
majority that believed a Right to Know existed, it was not constructed on a 
clear tort law principle but certain malleable structures of ethics.127  There is 
no scholarly consensus based on legal precedent, but rather anchored in  
medical ethics. However, there is a strong legal argument brought forth that 
this would be required disclosure under tort law.  At the outset of the genomic 
boom attorneys argued that a tort law duty existed: “[g]eneral tort principles of 
reasonable reliance provide that a person’s failure to disclose the existence of 
a known danger may result in liability for negligence where the plaintiff is 
misled.”128  Though the relationship between doctor and patient is one that  
requires disclosure because of the well-defined duties of a physician,  
researchers exist in a gray area. 
A. Researcher Classification: Are Organizational Data Analysts 
“Researchers”? 
Researchers can be classified in two distinct ways: as a new category  
entirely with no fiduciary duty, or in the bucket with third party physicians, a 
la those who are hired to perform pre-employment or during-employment  
exams.  Third-party physicians have largely been held to have a legal duty of 
disclosing incidental findings.129  Beyond this potentially analogous  
circumstance, there has been limited case law suggesting that researchers have 
a legal duty to disclose: “Most notably, the highest court in Maryland held, in 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, that there usually is a legal duty of care 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126. Pete Shanks, Baseball and Genetic Testing, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 3, 2009), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/genetic-crossroads/200908/baseball-and-genetic-testing. 
127. Pike et al., supra note 120. 
128. Sandra K. Lauro, The Science of Discrimination: Genetics in the American Workplace, 35 
BRIEF 14, 24 (2005). 
129. Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 444–45 (N.J. 2001); Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d 170, 
173–74 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). 
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in nontherapeutic research, and that a breach of this duty can give rise to a  
viable negligence action.”130  There is momentum towards researcher duty to 
disclose in cases like Pehle v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company,131 but no 
cohesive majority approach has been cemented.132  
In Pehle, plaintiffs were husband and wife who had unbeknownst to them 
contracted HIV and applied for life insurance from Farm Bureau Life  
Insurance Company.133  Farm Bureau forwarded their blood samples for blood 
tests at a third party laboratory named LabOne, and upon receiving the results 
informed the plaintiffs that they would be denied coverage.134  Further, Farm 
Bureau was willing to disclose the reason for denial if plaintiffs would like 
them to do so.135  Plaintiffs filed suit against both Farm Bureau and LabOne.136  
Pehle held that the LabOne relationship was too attenuated to hold the  
researcher liable but where a relationship exists in Farm Bureau the research 
creates a duty.137  This opens the door to a stronger relationship placing a duty 
on the research organization. 
Genomic research and big data health modeling are in many ways similar 
as they represent new technologies, new approaches that tort law has yet to 
adapt to.  This is not a new phenomenon as law often struggles to keep up with 
the expansion of technology.  Yet it appears that the past fifteen years have put 
technological discovery on an exponential growth curve, with law inept to 
catch up.138  Tort law will eventually be extended to address the radical  
evolution of big data, but this extension must occur before too much harm to 
individuals is done. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Big data is a modern addiction.  Whether in the form of collecting your 
step count, evaluating the reach of your Twitter audience, or projecting an  
individual’s personality based on Facebook likes, big data is everywhere.  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130. Matthew P. Gordon, A Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings to Research 
Subjects?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225 (2009). 
131. 397 F.3d 897, 899 (10th Cir. 2005). 
132. Gordon, supra note 130, at 226. 
133. 397 F.3d at 899. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 901. 
138. Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECHNOLOGY 
REVIEW (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-
pace-with-technology/. 
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health law, and ultimately tort law, there are a lot of tradeoffs that must be 
considered before constructing a comprehensive system to adjudicate an  
individual’s Right to Know.  Major League Baseball is one of the most data 
rich climates that currently exists, in which teams collect nearly limitless data 
and sift through information in order to create competitive advantages. 
Using advanced data collection systems like PITCHf/x and Statcast, Major 
League Baseball teams compete to create the most precise injury prediction 
models possible in order to protect and optimize the use of their player-assets.  
While this technology has the potential to offer tremendous value to both team 
and player, it comes with a potential conflict of interest.  Players’ goals are not 
always congruent with those of the organization: the player strives to protect 
his own career while the team is attempting to capitalize on the value of an  
asset.  For this reason, the player has an interest in accessing data that analyzes 
his potential injury risk.  This highlights a greater problem in big data: what 
rights will individuals possess regarding their own data points? 
This greater problem is solved by extending the Right to Know to adapt to 
the evolution of big data.  Informed consent and informed decision making are 
core rights in American jurisprudence.  Inside the bundle of sticks that  
compose informed consent exists the Right to Know.  Informed consent  
cannot occur without knowledge of the risks; and knowledge of risks cannot 
exist without an implicit Right to Know.  This Right to Know and emphasis on 
informed consent is found in many contexts, be it a person’s credit rating or 
the results of a pre-employment medical exam. 
Tort law has become increasingly uniform in determining that  
pre-employment and employment medical exams performed by a third party 
physician carry a duty to disclose any serious risk discovered by the physician.  
This is founded on the notion that any employee whose employer is collecting 
information on the risk or health of its employees trusts the physician or  
employer to disclose known risks.  That is, by collecting this data, the  
employer creates a relationship with a trusting potential employee.  Therefore, 
a Major League Baseball team collecting genomic information, PITCHf/x, 
Statcast and other data to integrate into an advanced risk model is incurring a 
duty to disclose any risk discovered to the player. 
This Right to Know must then be extended to employees of employers 
who use different devices to monitor the health and stability of their  
employees.  The Right to Know is derived a) from the purpose of informed 
consent, b) tort law decisions in cases involving the duty to disclose, and c) 
rights of access in other informational contexts.  As big data expands to influ-
ence more and more of an individual’s decision-making patterns, the Right to 
Know must grow alongside it. 
